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Abstract 
Russia's plans to import foreign SNF for storage and reprocessing meet serious 
public opposition. As a start of taking into account public concerns, programs of public 
involvement can be designed and implemented. In the paper, approaches to decision-
making on spent nuclear fuel management that differ in their commitment to public 
participation are discussed. The review of public opinion surveys in Russia that 
investigated public attitudes to spent fuel is given. Finally, the experience of several 
countries that have made serious progress in spent fuel management is analyzed with 
particular attention paid to the programs of public involvement and public opinion 
surveys. The aim is to understand the role of public opinion surveys in decision-making 
in this field and to describe how the surveys can be designed and conducted. This 
information might be useful for designing the programs of public involvement in 
Russia. 
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Public Opinion Surveys in Spent Nuclear Fuel Management 
Ekaterina Vasilieva (evasil@imm.uran.ru) 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Management of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) has a reputation as a highly controversial 
policy issue facing countries that use nuclear reactors for electric power generation. 
Each year the world’s reactors produce around 12,000 tons of SNF, and more than 
250,000 tons of SNF are now awaiting disposal or reprocessing1. The problem is 
growing because interim near-reactor storage facilities are reaching their capacity. Even 
if all the world’s reactors were to be closed, there would still be a need to find a method 
of disposing of those radioactive wastes that have already been created. Each country 
chooses its own strategy of SNF management. Such strategies could be an interim 
storage followed by direct disposal, a permanent monitored surface storage, or 
reprocessing. 
Besides the technical aspects, the SNF issue has also a social aspect, which is very 
important because of differences in perceptions among experts and the public. Experts 
engaged in promoting nuclear power argue that associated risks are comparatively low 
and manageable while large sections of the population and many experts are deeply 
opposed to the proposals and view risks as unacceptably high and threatening. Efforts to 
manage spent fuel raise a lively debate, which may escalate into a powerful 
confrontation. For example, the U.S. Department of Energy’s program to develop a 
national underground repository has been seriously delayed due to overwhelming 
political opposition fueled by perceptions of the public and many experts that the risks 
are immense and unacceptable. Also, the plans to build an international repository in 
Australia were rejected because of political and public opposition2. There are other 
examples where public opposition was one of the factors that led to reconsidering 
programs of SNF management. 
Russia’s plans to import foreign SNF for storage and reprocessing are also 
meeting serious public opposition. In order to take public concerns into account, 
programs of public involvement can be designed and implemented. One of the elements 
of such programs is public surveys. In this paper, the experience of several countries 
that have made serious progress in incorporating public involvement into spent fuel 
management is analyzed. Attention is paid to how public participation was organized, 
and, in particular, to public opinion surveys. Conclusions are made on what is the role 
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of public surveys in decision-making on SNF management, how to design and conduct 
surveys, and how their results could be used. This information might be useful for 
designing public involvement programs in Russia. 
 
 
2. Theoretical background 
 
According to [1], there are two basic approaches to decision-making in 
controversial issues such as siting of hazardous waste storage or reprocessing facilities: 
the ‘open’ and ‘closed’ approaches. They differ in their commitment to public 
participation. An example of the ‘closed’ approach is the so-called DAD (“decide, 
announce and defend”) policy. An example of the ‘open’ approach is a voluntary 
process. Of course, these two approaches represent extremes on a continuum of 
decision-making and a policy can exhibit characteristics of both open and closed 
approaches. 
The closed approach is optimal from a narrowly technical perspective because 
decisions are based on the views of experts and no money or time is spent on public 
negotiations.  But this approach is fraught with serious consequences such as escalation 
of public and political opposition, social unrest, and, eventually, loss of trust in state 
institutions. I.J. Duncan [2] notes that the so-called NIMBY (“not in my back-yard”) 
position “could be the child of ‘top down’ siting decisions usually based upon DAD 
policy“, and that “failures to obtain sites for investigation, let alone for a repository, 
have in part been due to technical failure, but more importantly due to industry and 
government failure to understand public concerns and attitudes”. In the same work we 
find the following: 
 
Recipe for Site Loss [2] 
• To maximize the attraction of NIMBY, have the site decided behind closed doors and 
then announced and defended (DAD). 
• Exclude local participation and be Foreign to the subject community. Be from another 
state, another country, be federal, be international. As our American friends would say, be from 
out of town!  
• Trust only yourselves. Make sure that the oversight body is male dominated, industry 
loaded, with perhaps some token female and government presence.  
• Rush the procedure, minimizing community involvement as much as possible.  
• Pretend that the site selected will only be used for scientific evaluation, certainly not for 
final disposal.  
• Distribute glossy brochures that depict the decay of radio toxicity in obscure units over 
time, both on a log/log scale, and hope that the lay population will each have degrees in physics, 
chemistry, mathematics and geology.  
• Do not publicly discuss compensation with the community or the surrounding area for 
fear of introducing the prospect of a "bribe".  
 3
 
The basic principle of the voluntary approach is that only communities that 
volunteer to investigate a facility are considered as potential hosts. Instead of fighting 
with communities that do not want the facility, interested communities are supported. 
The focus is primarily on social and political rather than technical and engineering 
aspects. It is becoming increasingly clear that there are advantages to a process of 
formal and informal consultation, communication and local involvement when 
undertaking the development of any large and controversial project, such as the siting of 
a radioactive waste disposal facility. The advantages of this approach stem from the 
increased openness and transparency in the decision-making process. In some countries 
public involvement is legally required in environmental decision-making. For example, 
there is a general consensus among the responsible bodies of the European Union that 
the public should be involved principally at the local level in decisions on the siting and 
licensing of radioactive waste management and disposal facilities3.  
In a typical consultation process on spent fuel management, draft proposals, which 
are sufficiently detailed to allow an informed opinion to be formed and a decision to be 
taken, are laid before the relevant public. This is done on the understanding that their 
concerns will be addressed and their expressed views fully taken into account. This may 
result in the modification or even abandoning of the proposals in their original form. 
The work [3] demonstrates the wide variation that exists from one national program to 
another in terms of the payments and benefits that have been, and are being, offered to 
encourage communities to take part in siting processes for nuclear waste facilities. The 
benefits may include direct payments, local tax reductions, employment guarantees, 
infrastructure improvements including highways, railroads, waterways, airports or other 
public projects, environmental improvements including the cleanup of existing air, 
water or waste problems, investments in public safety, education, public health. 
A similar distinction between different ways of decision-making is made in the 
work [4]. First, the author makes some comments on the nature of the problem of siting 
a potentially hazardous object: “The background to a conflict regarding siting is a clash 
of interests that in many cases emanates from the tension between the national and the 
local. From the national (and/or regional) perspective the installation is a necessity, 
whilst from the local perspective it is most often a disturbing nuisance. A siting conflict 
can also be based in a clash between different kinds of interest at the same geographical 
level.”  Then the author describes two possible extreme approaches to decision-making: 
autocracy and democracy. “…The response on how to tackle the ecological challenge 
can be placed on a continuum between autocracy and democracy. Those advocating 
autocracy assert that democracy is incapable to create sufficient and effective responses 
to the ecological challenge. The reason for this is that there are certain ecological 
principles that other values have to be subordinated to… The proposed solution is an 
ecologically enlightened and strong state that can exercise power on behalf of the 
collective interest. By force – centralized to the state – the citizenry and other actors in 
society should be compelled to make necessary changes… The other extreme point at 
the continuum is to be found within liberal democracy, which perceives democracy as a 
procedure for political decision-making. Similar to the case above, it states that ecology 
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and democracy can be in conflict with each other, but in contrast it asserts that in these 
cases democracy should have precedence.” 
In the last decade, there is a tendency in the world’s practices of SNF management 
to change policies from closed to open approach. This is how the idea is described in the 
work [3]: “It has become widely accepted over the last several years that an evolution 
has been occurring worldwide in the methodologies being used to site hazardous waste 
facilities, away from the centralized, top-down processes of the past (often referred to as 
‘Directed Siting’) and towards those in which the public is more involved… Previous 
work in this area4… described in particular the development of the ‘Volunteer Process’, 
in which siting studies are initially focused only on those communities expressing an 
interest in being considered, without obligation or commitment from either side. It also 
described other processes where some degree of pre-selection still takes place before 
volunteers are sought, referring to these as ‘Mixed-mode’, being as they are a 
combination of the ‘Volunteer’ and ‘Directed Siting’ processes. “ 
Preferences of the open approach and the need for open and public negotiations 
have been recognized by many authors, see, e.g., [2,5,6]. Most recent studies of 
policymaking in highly controversial, risk-plagued, and technical areas suggest that 
regulatory officials need to suspend the belief that the public is ‘irrational’ or unable to 
absorb complex debates. “People’s deep anxieties are linked to numerous realities, 
including the reality of radiation’s unique and powerful qualities, the reality of nuclear 
power’s links to nuclear proliferation and war, the reality of many serious examples of 
mismanagement… and the reality of extensive media coverage documenting major and 
minor problems and controversies involving nuclear technologies” [7]. Therefore public 
perceptions of the risks related to SNF reprocessing or disposal require careful 
assessment and explanation.  
The need for public participation in a decision-making process is also recognized 
in the work [6]: “The limitation that is common to most of the existing decision-making 
processes is that public opinions have been ignored or partly considered only to a 
limited degree… The position is taken that the public have to be persuaded or convinced 
after the decision has been made by the decision-maker. Therefore, efforts are normally 
directed towards advertisement and education as a means of attempting to change public 
attitudes and beliefs. This process sometimes creates situations so confrontational 
between the public and the decision-maker that there is a danger of each side insisting 
on its own adversarial stance resulting in public distrust of the decision-maker. If this 
occurs, the public will not be willing to accept the decision.” 
In the same work we find the following recommendations: “The importance of 
proper communication with the public has been recognized in the decision-making 
process. A comprehensive system of acquiring genuinely representative public opinions 
should be developed. To quantify public risk perception, a questionnaire is usually 
employed to take a public poll on the risk… The contents of the questionnaire should be 
simple and easy enough for the public to understand, but should be also soundly based, 
so that the public will be willing to participate in the poll. The use of a professional 
polling organization could improve the reliability and credibility of the results.” 
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As we see here, one of the elements of the open approach is investigation of 
public attitudes to the proposal. T. Litmanen [5] notes that in the last decade there is a 
tendency to view public reactions as prudent instead of considering them irrational. “As 
the volume of empirical research grew, it became evident that the public cannot be 
regarded as ignorant… Instead of being skeptical towards public concerns, the 
researcher takes these concerns seriously and sees that residents can inform the planners 
about the social, sociological, ethical and political questions revolving around the siting 
process… By understanding the logic and meanings of resistance, support and 
neutrality, it would be easier to establish a dialogue between the parties.” [5] 
It is important for federal and local authorities involved in SNF management to 
consider public concerns and perceptions when formulating policies and procedures.  It 
is clear that a valid picture of public opinion can be obtained only if the questions posed 
to people are designed to give them a chance to freely express their opinions, without 
leading clues and other distortions. If policy-makers have a valid picture of public 
opinion, they can employ a range of techniques to raise public understanding, gain 
public confidence and trust, and to move towards the establishment of public 
acceptability of the proposals.  
 
 
3. SNF management in Russia 
 
According to the national policy of the Russian Federation, SNF is subject to 
reprocessing, which is chemical processing of spent fuel with the aim to separate out 
plutonium, uranium, and waste products. The plutonium and the uranium can then be 
used to produce fresh reactor fuel. Also, there is a plan designed by Minatom (Ministry 
of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation) to import up to 20,000 tons of SNF for 
storage and reprocessing, thereby generating 20 billion dollars in total revenues. 
According to the Minatom’s plan, 7 billion dollars will be spent on state environmental 
programs. The imported SNF will be transported to the Krasnoyarsk region where it will 
be stored for 30-50 years. After the storage, when the radioactivity has decreased, a part 
of the foreign SNF will be returned to the countries of origin, and a part will be 
reprocessed and used in the nuclear cycle. In June 2001, the Russian parliament 
approved the necessary amendments to the laws. These amendments allow foreign SNF 
to be imported for storage and reprocessing. This is the first time in the history of SNF 
management that a large amount of foreign SNF is going to be brought into a country 
and stay there for a long time, possibly forever. At the official Minatom site we find the 
following details: “Reprocessing of foreign SNF will let Russia obtain the real source of 
financing not only for the construction of nuclear power plants that are more modern 
and safe, but also for realization of large-scale environment-oriented measures. If we 
import 20,000 tons of SNF, then only for its storage during 10 years we will get 20 
billion dollars, and the amount of received foreign SNF in Russia will not exceed 50% 
of its own SNF.”5  
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This proposal gave rise to a lot of discussions in the mass media and in many 
sections of the population. When considering the issue of import of foreign SNF into 
Russia, there arises in addition a moral problem of ‘buying foreign risks’. Quite 
understandably, people oppose the plans because they believe that it is unfair to be 
subject to risks that originate in another country. This idea is found in many studies, 
e.g., in [8]: “People accept risks more readily if the risk distribution is perceived as 
fair”. It is quite natural that moral issues are brought up in the debates, since risk 
debates are often about life and death. “Collectively shared interpretations of risks also 
contain moral judgments about what is acceptable and what is not. In the nuclear waste 
conflict this means that the risks, which are brought into the community from outside, 
offer a fertile ground for residents to discuss not only the construction project, but also 
more general social questions, such as what is important for them (e.g., their history or 
future), who they are (e.g., the question of identity) and what is their role in the wider 
society (e.g., questions about equity)” [5]. 
Although the issue of SNF import is very controversial and may affect people’s 
interests, there are no plans to hold a referendum, despite the continuing requests. For 
example, in the beginning of 1997, green movement activists collected 98,255 
signatures in the Krasnoyarsk region in a petition for a local referendum against the 
ongoing construction of the RT-2 plant. The plant is intended for storage and 
reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. Its construction was authorized in 1977, although 
actual construction was not started until 1984.  In 1989 the construction was halted due 
both to a lack of funding and strong opposition against the facility on the local level. 
The first referendum in Krasnoyarsk region was held in the early nineties and resulted in 
a lack of support for the construction of the plant. A second referendum was requested 
in 1997, but at the Region Council hearings on April 18 the initiative was rejected by a 
majority of the deputies. The council referred to the RT-2 being subject to supervision 
by Federal authorities in Moscow, leaving regional authorities powerless in the matter6. 
In autumn 2000, Russian environmental groups collected around 2.5 million 
signatures in support of a national referendum to restore state environmental agencies 
and to ban nuclear waste/material import into the country. The Russian Central 
Electoral Committee rejected around 600,000 signatures and declared that the required 2 
million criterion for starting the vote was short by 127,000 signatures 7. 
The next attempt to request a referendum in Krasnoyarsk region took place in 
February 2002 when activists submitted more than 40,000 signatures on a demand of a 
regional referendum on the issue of managing SNF in Krasnoyarsk region. The regional 
election commission disqualified around 90% of the signatures, thereby rejecting the 
referendum. In April, the initiative group filed an appeal against this decision. The court 
declared the decision unlawful, but also rejected the referendum saying that the storage 
and disposition of nuclear waste was the prerogative of the federal government.8 
In the last few years several opinion polls that addressed the issue of SNF 
management have been held in Russia. Most of them were conducted at the time when 
the bills allowing import of SNF into Russia were being discussed in the Parliament. 
Below is a review of the polls.  
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In April-October 2000 a series of opinion polls was conducted in several Russian 
cities: Chelyabinsk9 (25.04 - 05.05), Novosibirsk10 (14.08 - 20.08), Tomsk11 (21.08 – 
20.08), Ekaterinburg12 (17.09 – 22.09), and Ozersk13 (25.09 – 01.10). They were 
organized by a sociologist, Nadezhda Kutepova, who is a post-graduate student at the 
Ural State University and a green activist. More than 4000 people participated in 
telephone interviews on ecological issues. In this survey, some of the questions were 
apparently designed to change people’s attitudes. For example, Chelyabinsk citizens 
were asked the following question: “Do you know that the Chelyabinsk region is 
considered to be the most radioactively-contaminated in the world?” without 
mentioning by whom it is considered such. 
In each of the cities two questions addressed SNF management in Russia. These 
questions are given below together with the results. 
The first question: “The Ministry of Atomic Energy of Russia is going to bring for 
storage to the Russian territory 20 thousand tons of foreign spent nuclear fuel. Do you 
know about it?” (In Chelyabinsk: “The Ministry of Atomic Energy is going to bring for 
storage to the territory of the Chelyabinsk region tons of foreign spent nuclear fuel. Do 
you know about it?” Note that the questionnaire presents Chelyabinsk, not Krasnoyarsk, 
as the destination of imported SNF.) 
 
 Yes, I know No, I don’t know Hard to answer 
Chelyabinsk 45,2% 49,6% 5,2% 
Novosibirsk 51,9% 45,2% 2,8% 
Tomsk 57,3% 41,3% 1,4% 
Ekaterinburg 53,0% 47,0% 0,0% 
Ozersk 63,0% 34,2% 2,8% 
 
The second question: “Do you think that it is acceptable to import foreign spent 
nuclear fuel to the territory of Russia?” (In Chelyabinsk: “In your opinion, is it 
acceptable to import foreign spent nuclear fuel for storage to the territory of the 
Chelyabinsk region?”) 
 
 Yes, acceptable No, unacceptable Hard to answer 
Chelyabinsk 3,5% 93,3% 3,2% 
Novosibirsk 5,7% 87,6% 6,7% 
Tomsk 7,7% 87,9% 4,4% 
Ekaterinburg 3,7% 92,7% 3,7% 
Ozersk 30,1% 58,2% 11,7% 
 
As we see, the overwhelming majority of the people answered “No” to the second 
question. It is remarkable that results of the poll in Ozersk differ considerably from the 
results in the other cities. This can be explained by the fact that Ozersk is a closed city 
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where Mayak Production Association is located, and Mayak operates a spent fuel 
reprocessing facility RT-1. 
In September 2000, the research group ROMIR at the request of Greenpeace 
conducted a survey poll using a representative all-Russian urban sample14. 1111 
respondents were asked the following question: “What is your attitude to the import to 
the Russian territory from other countries of radioactive materials for storage, disposal, 
or reprocessing?” The poll gave the following distribution of the answers. 
 
Definitely negative 81.5% 
Rather negative 12.0% 
Neutral 3.9% 
Rather positive 0.4% 
Definitely positive 0.4% 
Hard to answer \ Refuse to answer 1.4% 
 
In April 2001, VCIOM (All-Russian Center of Public Opinion Investigation) 
conducted a national public opinion survey15. 1600 respondents were asked among 
others the question: “On the whole, do you support the idea of reprocessing and storage 
of spent nuclear fuel from other countries?” The results were as follows: 
 
Support 11% 
Do not support 82% 
Hard to answer 7% 
 
In May 2001, before the Parliament vote on the amendments allowing import of 
SNF, the research group ROMIR conducted a research poll asking people the following 
questions16. 
“Will you support a representative of your region at the following parliament 
elections if he or she votes for the bills allowing import of radioactive materials for 
reprocessing, storage, and disposal?” 
 
Definitely yes 1.0% 
Rather yes 2.4% 
Rather no 12.4% 
Definitely no 78.9% 
Hard to answer \ Refuse to answer 5.3% 
 
“Will you support a party / movement / block at the following parliament 
elections if the fraction of this party / movement / block votes for the bills allowing 
import of radioactive materials for reprocessing, storage, and disposal?” 
 
Definitely yes 0.9% 
Rather yes 2.4% 
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Rather no 12.0% 
Definitely no 79.6% 
Hard to answer \ Refuse to answer 5.0% 
 
In June 2001, after the Duma had approved the bills allowing import of foreign 
SNF, the research group ROMIR conducted telephone interviews with 500 Muscovites 
asking them “Who will benefit from passing of the bills?”  The results were the 
following17. 
 
Foreign suppliers of SNF 28.0% 
Minatom 19.6% 
Russian Government 17.8% 
Deputies of the Duma 9.2% 
All Russian population 4.1% 
Other 6.1% 
Nobody 6.3% 
Hard to answer 8.9% 
 
In July 2001, “The public Opinion Foundation” conducted a nation-wide survey, 
asking 1500 respondents and, in addition, 500 muscovites, the following questions:18  
“Do you know, have you heard something, or is it the first time you have heard 
that ‘Yabloko’ leader Grigory Yavlinsky has called for a referendum on the import of 
spent nuclear fuel into Russia?” 
 
  Total Russia Total Moscow 
I know about it 17% 31% 
I've heard about it 37% 38% 
This is the first time I've heard 
about it 41% 30% 
Hard to answer 5% 1% 
 
“Do you support the idea of holding a referendum on the import of spent nuclear fuel 
into Russia, or not?” 
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  Total Russia Total Moscow
Support 70% 70% 
Don’t support 19% 21% 
Hard to answer 
 
11% 9% 
“If a referendum on the import of spent nuclear fuel into Russia were held, would you 
vote in this referendum, or not?” 
  Total Russia Total Moscow
Yes 73% 77% 
No 17% 16% 
Hard to 
answer 
9% 7% 
 
“Would you vote for or against importing spent nuclear fuel into Russia?” (Responses 
of those saying they would vote in the referendum). 
  Total Russia Total Moscow
For 8% 9% 
Against 62% 63% 
Hard to answer 4% 5% 
 
Finally, the Russian Internet site “Glas Runeta” (www.voxru.net) is holding an 
on-line opinion poll “Nuclear fuel”19.  This poll has started on September 7, 2001 and it 
has 8 questions. There are at the moment as much as 7534 answers to one of the 
questions. It should be noted that an Internet vote might be highly biased. Nevertheless, 
below the distribution of the answers to one of the questions is cited. 
The question: “What is your attitude to import to the Russian territory from other 
countries of spent nuclear fuel for reprocessing, storage and/or disposal?” 
 
Definitely negative 48.1% 
Rather negative 21.6% 
Neutral 10.6% 
Rather positive 9.5% 
Definitely positive 7.5% 
Hard to answer 2.7% 
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There is a considerable difference between these results and the results of the survey 
poll hold in September 2000 by ROMIR. It is not clear if this difference can be 
explained by different attitudes of Internet users, by inaccuracies in Internet polling, or 
by other reasons. 
If we compare Russia with other nuclear countries, such as the USA, Canada, 
Sweden, we find that the amount of public opinion surveys on people’s attitudes to SNF 
management is comparatively low. Moreover, there were no surveys designed to find 
the reasons behind people’s attitudes. Minatom’s efforts to convince people that the 
import of foreign SNF is a necessity concentrate on educating with no serious programs 
of public involvement. Minatom appears to have chosen the closed approach, which has 
its disadvantages. The case studies show that the countries that made some progress in 
spent fuel management have moved their policies towards more open approach during 
their attempts to solve the problem. This transition will be shown in the next section for 
several countries. 
 
 
4. Case studies 
 
In this section three countries are considered. In each case the policy of the 
country on SNF management and the history of attempts to solve the problem is 
described. Particular attention is paid to the programs of public involvement and to 
organization and results of opinion polls. 
 
 
4.1. Finland20 
 
At present, Finland has two nuclear plants situated in Loviisa and Olkiluoto. Each 
of the plants operates two nuclear reactors. The two Finnish nuclear power plants 
produce a total of some 70 tons of spent fuel every year. Also, on 24 May 2002, the 
Finnish Parliament ratified the decision on the construction of the fifth nuclear reactor. 
There are no plans for reprocessing of the produced SNF. Therefore, it is classified as 
nuclear waste. Finnish nuclear waste management is guided by the Nuclear Energy Act 
and Decree (1988). In 1994 the Nuclear Energy Act was amended so that all nuclear 
waste produced in Finland must be disposed of in Finland. Until the end of 1996, all 
nuclear waste generated at Loviisa was transported to a Russian reprocessing plant. The 
Nuclear Energy Act also prohibits the import of nuclear waste. 
The basic principle of nuclear waste management in Finland is that each producer 
is responsible for the safe management and disposal of the waste as well as for the 
financing of these operations. In 1995 the waste management divisions of the both 
nuclear power plants united to form a new company, Posiva, which is responsible for 
the research, development and planning work of final disposal of SNF. It is planned that 
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the spent fuel will be encapsulated and disposed of in bedrock at a depth of about half a 
kilometer. Final disposal site investigations have been done on four localities. They 
were Kuhmo, Äänekoski, Olkiluoto, and Hästholmen at Loviisa. After the preliminary 
investigations, Posiva has proposed that Olkiluoto be chosen for the final disposal site. 
This proposal was approved by the Decision in Principle ratified by the Parliament on 
18th May 2001. The construction of the final disposal facility is scheduled to start in the 
2010s. The facility should be operational after 2020. At the earliest, all nuclear waste 
will be disposed of in the middle of the 2100s. The tunnels will be filled and the 
encapsulation plant decommissioned. It is remarkable that at the moment Finland is the 
only country in the world to have set a program for SNF disposal that has not been 
delayed by any process or event.21 
The decision to set up a separate company responsible for SNF management was 
one of the measures the companies believe was important for building public confidence 
in the program. Another element in building public confidence has been to ensure that 
the finance is available to carry out the program, which will continue for many decades. 
Posiva is responsible not only for completing research, development, and site 
investigations, but also for ensuring local and political acceptance at each step of the 
program. One of the tasks is to dispel public disquiet about the repository. The Nuclear 
Energy Act and Decree implies that the local municipality and the Finnish Center for 
Radiation and Nuclear Safety (STUK) have first to approve the siting and development 
of a waste disposal facility before the government and the parliament can provide the 
final authorization. The proposed host municipality, therefore, has the right of veto, and 
this fact has helped local populations to accept the site investigations.  
Numerous public surveys were conducted in Finland to assess public attitudes to 
SNF management. Some of them were national, and some of them were conducted in 
the municipalities that were considered to be potential hosts. Also, Finland participated 
in two EU surveys on the attitudes to radioactive waste management. The latest of them, 
“Europeans and radioactive waste”22, was carried out in Autumn 2001 at the request of 
the European Commission’s Directorate-General Energy & Transport. The survey 
covered the population of the European Union aged 15 and over; in total, some 16,000 
interviews were conducted. All interviews were face-to face in respondents’ homes and 
conducted in the appropriate national language. The survey investigated how well 
people are informed about radioactive waste and which sources of information they 
trust; reactions to such issues as national versus regional disposal sites, reasons for the 
present impasse in developing geological repositories, people’s concerns about such 
sites and other related issues.   
In Finland, a follow-up study called “Energy attitudes of the Finns” has been 
investigating attitudes towards questions concerning energy policy for seventeen years 
(1983-1999).23 In the time series concerning the entire follow-up period, the total 
number of participants is 25,077. The study series makes it possible to trace how 
people’s attitudes have been changing through the years. For example, as seen from the 
graph below, the percentage of people who considers that the disposal of nuclear waste 
in the Finnish bedrock is safe has grown from 14% to 29%. 
                                                 
21
 High-level waste and spent-fuel disposal research strategy. Task 1.2: International programme analysis. 
Report to DETR. QuantiSci. 1998. 
22
 http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/nuclear/pdf/eb56_radwaste_en.pdf 
23
 http://www.sci.fi/~pena/eas99eng/eng-eas99.htm 
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Distributions of the answers to the question 
“It is safe to dispose of nuclear waste in the Finnish bedrock?” 
National surveys, 1983-1999 
 
In 1999, the study included also answers of the people who represented the population 
of Loviisa, Eurajoki, Kuhmo and Äänekoski, i.e. the municipalities that were being 
investigated as potential hosts of a repository. It is remarkable that the majority of the 
people living in Loviisa and Eurajoki (61% and 62%) accept the location of the 
repository in their municipalities. One of the reasons for accepting could be that these 
two municipalities are already familiar with nuclear technologies as they host the two 
Finnish nuclear power plants. 
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Distributions of the answers to the question 
“Do you agree with the statement ‘If research showed that my municipality of 
residence is a safe place for the final disposal of Finnish nuclear waste, I would accept 
the disposal of Finnish nuclear waste in the area of my municipality’?” 
 
The position of people in Eurajoki on the final disposal project was also studied in 
February 2000. The study showed that a clear majority of them (78%)24 were willing to 
accept the building of the final disposal facility in Olkiluoto, provided the safety of the 
project is verified through research and an official safety assessment. In logical 
consequence of this, the Municipal Council of Eurajoki decided in January 2000 to 
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support the construction of the final disposal facility in Olkiluoto as proposed in the 
application for the policy decision.  
In January 2000, a nationwide poll was also conducted, asking Finnish people 
whether nuclear waste generated in Finland should also be disposed of in Finland, and 
what their feelings were about continuing the project after STUK had decided in favor 
of the final disposal facility.25 As many as 92% of Finnish adults supported the disposal 
of nuclear waste in Finland. 78% of the people also felt that research and preparations 
for the final disposal in Eurajoki should be continued in compliance with the application 
for the policy decision. 
Another example of the serious study on people’s attitudes to siting a repository is 
the article [5], in which results of the surveys conducted in Eurajoki, Äänekoski, and 
Kuhmo were analyzed with the aim to explain differences of attitudes in these 
municipalities. The thesis of the paper is that in order to understand different opinions 
about a facility, one must understand the cultural logic of risk perception, because social 
background is connected with attitudes towards the siting of nuclear waste. The author 
provides some conclusions for the policy-makers: “An interesting result was the notion 
that the supporters of the project have more knowledge about the siting of nuclear waste 
than its opponents. From this the nuclear industry usually draws the conclusion that 
more information has to be given to the opponents so that their views would change. 
The conclusion is too hasty from the viewpoint of the cultural approach; the results do 
not necessarily indicate ignorance on the part of the opponents. The opponents may be 
unwilling to receive information about the project because they do not regard it as 
acceptable. Instead of spending resources to the education of strong opponents, it would 
be more important to study the cultural basis of the resistance. By understanding the 
logic and meaning of resistance, support and neutrality, it would be easier to establish a 
dialogue between the parties.” 
Decision-making on nuclear waste management in Finland certainly has features 
of the open approach. To this testifies the fact that municipalities have the right to veto 
the decision on the siting of a repository. It is not very clear if the awareness of this 
right increases the percentage of supporters, but it is a rare case that a community is 
willing to accept a radioactive waste repository on its territory. Also, numerous public 
surveys helped to take into account people’s concerns about safety, thereby increasing 
the chances of acceptance. Finland is, at present, one of the most successful countries in 
SNF management. 
 
4.2.  Sweden26 
 
According to the Swedish law, the companies that own nuclear power plants are 
responsible for the handling and final disposal of nuclear waste. The nuclear companies 
have formed a joint company, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co. 
(SKB), to fulfill this requirement. Currently, the spent nuclear fuel is stored one year at 
the reactor pool, and then transported to the Central Storage for Spent Fuel (CLAB) 
situated near to the Oskarshamn Nuclear Power Plant. No repository has yet been 
constructed for spent nuclear fuel. Work within the industry focuses on final disposal in 
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the bedrock. However, the method has not yet received final approval. Furthermore, a 
site has not yet been selected to host the repository. The siting process is in progress and 
a number of municipalities are currently participating in investigations. The nuclear 
industry hopes that construction of a repository can start by 2008. 
In the search for a suitable site for the repository, SKB has been conducting 
studies of geologic suitability in the country since the mid-1970s. Between 1977 and 
1985, test drillings were made at about 10 sites. The first drillings faced protests by 
local authorities and demonstrators. Protestors held many actions in the effort to stop 
testing27. For example, in one of the municipalities, the tests faced demonstrators 
blocking the road to the test site for three days in February 1981. In another 
municipality, in 1983 local groups and politicians asked for adequate information and 
that an independent geologist could take part in analyzing the results. However, SKB 
refused the request of an independent geologist, as he "would merely be in the way". In 
June 1984, some 40 meters of drill cores were stolen from a container. In an anonymous 
reaction to a newspaper, a geologist report said the drill cores showed the unsuitability 
of the bedrock for waste disposal. People criticized the lack of information. In a 
newspaper SKB said: "We do not have the time to sit in on a series of showy meetings. 
We consider that the meetings cried for by the public have nothing to do with public 
information." A blockade was organized on the road to the test site and was cleared by 
the police. Finally, the energy and environment minister reprimanded SKB for its lack 
of information dissemination. SKB had to change its policy. The concept of 
voluntariness was the centerpiece of their new strategy. There is a comment on this 
policy change in the work [3]: “SKB's siting activities also show the now typical 
evolution away from a 'Directed Siting' process to one involving the use of 
volunteerism. Investigations by SKB began in the late 1970's, designed initially to 
demonstrate the existence of potentially suitable geological formations. These included 
detailed work at as many as 11 sites up until 1985, some of which was terminated 
because of intense local opposition, after which SKB concentrated its siting work on 
desk-studies. From 1992 onwards the siting process became 'Mixed-mode', with SKB 
inviting any kommun interested in the possibility of being examined as to its suitability, 
to volunteer for an initial desk-based feasibility study.” 
The new basic rule for locating a repository is that the local community, or rather 
their elected representatives, needs to accept the facility. The government can overrule a 
local veto, but would then be required to demonstrate that there is no more suitable 
place for the repository and that would be hard to prove. SKB has decided, furthermore, 
that they will only apply for repository development at a volunteer community and, in 
addition, it is hard to see sufficient political will in the government to go against a local 
community on this issue. Consequently, local communities have to all practical 
purposes a full veto28. One of the fundamental requirements for site selection is that the 
process is conducted on democratic grounds and that the people who live in the 
municipality have confidence in the facility. This means that the municipalities 
concerned, with the insight and involvement of their communities, should give their 
consent to each stage of SKB’s site investigation program. 
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 High-level waste and spent-fuel disposal research strategy. Task 1.2: International programme analysis. 
Report to DETR. QuantiSci. 1998. 
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In accordance with these principles, in October 1992 SKB sent out an inquiry to 
all rural districts (kommun) in the country and asked them if they wanted more 
information about the handling of radioactive waste and if they where interested in 
further examination of the possibilities of locating a disposal site in their area. The 
kommuns have been told that a number of social benefits are likely should a facility 
eventually be sited. These would include such things as improved infrastructure, 
enhanced local employment opportunities etc. Between 1993 and 2000, SKB has 
conducted feasibility studies in eight municipalities that volunteered to be investigated, 
namely Storuman, Malå, Östhammar, Nyköping, Oskarshamn, Tierp, Älvkarleby and 
Hultsfred. The feasibility studies considered a wide spectrum of aspects concerning the 
feasibility of a repository in the community (including social and economic issues). In 
2002, after the feasibility studies, SKB started more detailed site investigations at 
Oskarshamn and Östhammar.  
Swedish attitudes on nuclear disposal have been studied by seven national polls at 
6-month intervals from June 1992 to December 199529 conducted by the Swedish 
polling firm SIFO on behalf of SKB. As an example, 1023 persons aged between 16 and 
74, were interviewed between November 29 and December 12, 1995. The results show 
no significant variation over time. A majority of 69±2% felt doubt or uncertainty 
regarding safety in disposal, but 87±1% accepted disposal in Sweden. An impressive 
majority of 80±3% said they would accept inclusion of their home municipality in 
studies regarding disposal, and 55±3% were even prepared to accept disposal there, if 
that would offer the best site.  
The SIFO data have been widely quoted as supporting the thesis that Swedes were 
ready to accept nuclear waste. However, the results of two later local referenda stood in 
sharp contrast with SIFO data. The first of these referenda was conducted in September 
1995 in the municipality of Storuman. The feasibility study report in Storuman was 
positive to continuing the investigations, but strong local opinion demanded a local 
referendum. The question put to the local public was whether or not SKB should be 
allowed to continue the search for a location for a final repository in Storuman or not. 
The outcome was an overwhelming "no" (70.5%). This is how the story was covered in 
the news: 
“The nuclear industry and the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management 
Company (SKB) had thought that Storuman would be a suitable place for the disposal 
facility, since unemployment is very high in that area (14%), and the population very 
small. The SKB promised 700 temporary jobs for the 10-year construction period and 
200 permanent jobs for the next 50 years. The mayor of the city and district council 
agreed to the project. The resistance of the local population however was greater than 
expected. The SKB launched a massive campaign for a ‘Yes’ vote, but a poster 
produced by a local activist group, ‘Action group against radwaste in Storuman’, which 
showed a dead elk and carried the text ‘0 to 240,000 years’, made a stronger impression 
on the people. The rejection of the Storuman facility is a very big snag for the Swedish 
nuclear industry. The licenses for nuclear power plants in Sweden depend on a 
convincing radioactive waste disposal concept. As the planned facility in Storuman has 
fallen through, the SKB is now stumped with the problem of finding a new site.”30  
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 SIFO (The National Institute for Consumer Research). Report 3251930. SIFO AB, Stockholm (1995). 
30
 http://www.antenna.nl/wise/441/4347.html 
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The second local referendum, held in the municipality of Malå 1997, also led to 
stopping of further investigations. The citizens voted against further examinations in the 
area: 54 percent no and 44 percent yes. 
The contrast between the results of the national polls and of the local referenda led 
several researches to investigate the issue. For example, the work [9] argues that SIFO 
has chosen the wrong methodology. The authors conducted several research polls and 
compared their results with SIFO’s results. The aim was to investigate the influence of 
question formulation and of the method of interviewing on the results. The conclusion is 
that “if the purpose of the SIFO poll was to get a true picture of public opinion, it 
failed”. The authors believe that “the reason why SIFO obtained much higher 
acceptance rates seems to reside in the face-to-face interaction process of their in-home 
interviews. Another reason was the use of subtle leading cues, assuming that the ’best’ 
siting has been found, or lack of an explicit reminder about a policy being pertinent for 
the respondent’s own community.” 
An extensive research poll on the socio-psychological effects of the repository 
was carried out recently in the municipalities that were investigated as potential hosts.31 
A variety of questions on people’s attitudes to nuclear power, nuclear waste, and the 
siting process were asked. It is remarkable, that, according to the results, population of 
the communities that already have nuclear objects on their territory (Oskarshamn and 
Östhammar) is more willing to accept a repository on their territory. As an example, 
here is the distributions of the answers to the question: “Do you think that SKB should 
be allowed to conduct a site investigation, i.e. carry out test drilling, for a repository for 
spent nuclear fuel in your municipality?” 
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In  the case of Sweden we can observe the transition towards the open approach 
and that one has to be careful when using results of opinion polls because they can be 
misleading. 
  
 
4.3. The USA32 , 33 
 
The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 requires the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE) to locate, build and operate a deep geologic repository for the permanent 
disposal of high-level nuclear waste. Originally, DOE selected nine locations in six 
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states that met its criteria for consideration as potential repository sites. Following 
preliminary technical studies and environmental assessments of five sites, DOE chose 
three sites in 1986 for intensive scientific study: Yucca Mountain, Nevada; Deaf Smith 
County, Texas; and Hanford, Washington. After extensive environmental assessments 
of all three sites, Congress, in its 1987 amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 
eliminated two of the three sites from further consideration and designated Yucca 
Mountain as the site to be studied. DOE was obliged to start removing SNF to the 
repository in 1998. However, in 1987, DOE announced a five-year delay in the opening 
date for a centralized repository, from 1998 to 2003. One of the reasons for the delay 
was that the effort to study and confirm a site’s suitability proved more time-consuming 
and costly than the Congress and DOE expected. Another reason was political and 
public opposition. In particular, the state of Nevada has been fighting DOE’s program 
on the grounds that the site is unsafe, pointing to potential volcanic activity, 
earthquakes, water infiltration, underground flooding, nuclear chain reactions, and fossil 
fuel and mineral deposits that might encourage future human intrusion. The history of 
this fighting can be found, for example, in [10]. Two years later, DOE announced a 
further delay, until 2010. At present, the repository is at lease 12 years behind schedule, 
and no site has been selected for an interim storage facility. The nation’s spent fuel, 
which amounts to 40,000 tons, is stored at 131 sites in 39 states, primarily at reactor 
storage facilities. These facilities are now almost full, because storage space at reactors 
was deliberately limited in the expectation that spent fuel would be shipped to a more 
permanent storage facility.  
On February 15, 2002, the President approved the Secretary of Energy's 
recommendation of Yucca Mountain as the site for a national used nuclear fuel 
repository. In his letter of recommendation to the President, Secretary of Energy 
Spencer Abraham said: “After months of study based on scientific and technical 
research unique in its scope and depth, and after reviewing the result of a public review 
process that went well beyond the requirements of law, I reached the conclusions that 
technically and scientifically the Yucca Mountain site is fully suitable; that development 
of a repository serves the national interests in numerous and important ways; and that 
the arguments against its designation do not rise to a level that would outweigh the case 
for going forward.”34 In April 2002, Nevada objected to the President's 
recommendation, but these objections were over-ruled when the House of 
Representatives and the Senate endorsed the President’s approval in May 2002, and in 
July 2002, respectively. DOE must now file a license application with the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission before it can build and operate the repository. 
The decision to consider Yucca Mountain as a repository site has led to an intense 
debate regarding the economic, social and political impacts of the repository. One of the 
problems with the assessment of related risks is that scientific confidence about the 
concept of deep geologic disposal has turned out to be difficult to apply to specific sites. 
Every high-level waste site that has been proposed by DOE and its predecessor agencies 
has faced allegations or discovery of unacceptable flaws, such as groundwater flow or 
earthquake vulnerability, that could release radioactivity into the environment. Much of 
the problem results from the inherent uncertainty involved in predicting waste site 
performance for the 10,000-year period (or longer) that nuclear waste is to be isolated. 
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Most of the opposition to the Yucca Mountain project comes from the state of 
Nevada. Not only are most Nevadans opposed to the repository, their opposition is 
shared by the state's political leadership. In fact, when Congress singled out Yucca 
Mountain as the only site for detailed study in 1987, the state's political leaders reacted 
by establishing a firm policy opposing the project. Today that policy remains as the 
state's official position. 
Public participation in the decision-making process was organized through the 
system of public hearings and comments35. The three primary involved federal agencies 
- DOE, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) – have sought public participation through public meetings, hearings, comment 
periods, and other mechanisms. For example, DOE satisfied legal requirements for 
public participation by conducting more than 100 public hearings to discuss the Draft 
Environmental Impact Statement, siting characterization work, and other public and 
technical issues. Most of the hearings were held in Nevada. Also, DOE received written 
public comments for about 200 days and citizens also could share their comments and 
concerns at DOE’s Yucca Mountain Web site. EPA held public hearings on its proposed 
standards for Yucca Mountain in October 1999 and received about 800 comments 
during the 90-day public comment period. 
There were many efforts to make information about the project publicly available. 
For example, in November 2001, DOE held an ‘open house’ at the Yucca Mountain for 
those citizens wishing to visit the facility and to speak with project scientists and 
engineers about the ongoing work at the site. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham 
said on this occasion: "I have previously indicated that I would review suggestions 
about additional public involvement. One important way we can increase the quality 
and scope of information available to the public is to allow those citizens who wish to 
see the site for themselves to do so at an 'open house.' The 'open house' will provide 
citizens with an important opportunity to learn more about the science and engineering 
work being conducted at the Yucca Mountain site. In addition, citizens will be able to 
ask our scientist and engineers questions regarding the project"36. 
There were a huge amount of surveys conducted in the USA in order to assess 
public attitudes and opinions regarding the management of SNF. A report titled “Public 
opinion polling and the Yucca Mountain controversy: a seven year inventory”37 
published in 1993 presents an inventory of public opinion polling activities related to 
the Yucca Mountain project and held between December 1986 and June 1993. This 
inventory contains 56 public opinion polls discussed in terms of sponsor 
intentions/objectives, populations polled, survey design/implementation characteristics, 
and media attention to key factors. Of these 56 polls, 43 were held in Nevada.  There 
was a particularly wide variety of poll questions on whether Nevadans support or 
oppose the repository (with around 70% Nevadans stating their opposition in the most 
of the surveys), other questions addressed the issues of whether the state government 
should do everything possible to prevent building the repository, what expectation 
Nevadans held as to the inevitability of the repository, what levels of trust people had in 
repository-related officials, whether people were willing to make a compensatory deal 
for the repository, and others. 
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One of the latest public opinion surveys was conducted between June 6th and 
June 19th, 2002 by Northwest Survey & Data Services based in Eugene, Oregon and 
affiliated with the University of Oregon38. In this survey, 406 Nevadans gave complete 
telephone interviews, each answering 23 questions, of which 15 addressed issues related 
to Yucca Mountain project. The survey found that after all DOE’s efforts to convince 
people that the repository is safe, over 76% of Nevadans oppose the project and would 
vote against it if given the opportunity. Only slightly more than 20% support the 
project. Analysis of the results of past surveys conducted since 1989 shows that the 
level of opposition to the Yucca Mountain project has remained consistently high for 
the past 13 years. Nevadans also remain opposed to the state abandoning the fight to 
stop the Yucca Mountain project. 65% of the respondents favored continuing state 
opposition, even if that meant turning down benefits, while just under 31% favored 
making a deal. These survey finding were remarkably consistent with the results for the 
same question from past surveys. The survey also asked a number of other questions 
regarding Nevadans’ perceptions of risks associated with various aspects of the Yucca 
Mountain project, the transportation of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive 
waste, and actions the state might take in an effort to oppose the project.  
In the survey39 conducted in 1998 by the University of Nevada, 1200 respondents 
were asked to answer 50 questions. Four of the questions related to the Yucca Mountain 
project. Here is the distribution of the answers to the question: “How do you stand on 
the plan to permanently store high-level nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain in Southern 
Nevada?” 
 
Strongly oppose 57% 
Oppose 18% 
Neutral 11% 
Support 8% 
Strongly support 2% 
Don’t know 4% 
 
Here 75% oppose the repository, which is consistent with other Nevada surveys. 
While a majority of Nevadans oppose the repository, all-American surveys show 
support for the project. In the poll held May 31 to June 2, 2002 by Bisconti Research, 
Inc., telephone interviews were conducted with a nationally representative sample of 
1000 U.S. adults.40 According to the results, 92% of the American public believes it is 
extremely or very important to have a clear plan of action for handling the high-level 
radioactive waste from nuclear power plants. Answering the question “Which way of 
handling high-level radioactive waste do you think is more helpful to our environment 
in the long run?”,  57% of the respondents have chosen a permanent underground waste 
disposal facility and 19% have chosen to leave the waste above ground at the plant sites. 
Also, a November 2000 survey41 of 500 college graduates who are registered to vote 
found a strong support for presidential approval to move forward with the project. 70% 
of respondents believe that the President should give his approval for the NRC to 
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proceed with a licensing review if the site is considered geologically suitable. These 
results are consistent with the findings of previous (September 2000, 1995, 1994) 
surveys. 
There were many articles published in journals and books that discuss policy 
issues related to the Yucca Mountain project and analyze methodology and results of 
public opinion polls, see [10-13] and references in them. In the articles, attention is paid 
to possible reasons behind citizen’s perceptions of the associated risks. 
As a conclusion, we may note that decision-making on SNF in the USA has 
features of the both closed and open approaches. In the last few years, federal agencies 
tried to pay more attention to public involvement. But in spite of the policy of openness 
and the program of public hearings and comments, Nevadans remain strongly opposed 
to Yucca Mountain project. They feel that there participation in public hearings and 
their comments cannot change decisions taken by federal authorities. Due to the 
numerous public surveys, policy-makers have a full picture of public attitudes, but 
efforts to change these attitudes through educating and public involvement are mostly 
ineffective.  
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
The issue of spent nuclear fuel management has proven to be quite controversial. 
After several decades of struggle, there are countries that are on the way to find solution 
to the problem. In all the cases public acceptance is crucial for the success of the siting 
projects. Public opinion surveys are the instruments to measure acceptance and to find 
motives for people’s attitudes to the issues related to nuclear waste management. 
The Finnish program of SNF disposal has been quite successful so far. Currently, 
the investigations are going on in Olkiluoto, whiah is considered to be the final disposal 
site. According to the results of public opinion polls, the population of Eurajoki, which 
is the host municipality, is willing to accept the facility by a large margin. The 
acceptance is crucial to the project, because, according to the state policy, municipalities 
have the right to veto the decision on the siting of a repository. The Finnish case is also 
an example of siting a repository in the region that already has a nuclear installation, 
namely, a nuclear power plant.  
In Sweden, the site for a final high-level waste repository has not yet been 
selected, but the site selection program is being implemented according to schedule. The 
first, ‘direct siting’, stage of site selection (1977-1985) was characterized by protests 
from the population and local authorities. After the period of desk-studies, a new 
strategy, which used the concept of voluntariness, was introduced in 1992. According to 
this strategy, the local communities should give their consent to each stage of the site 
investigation program. Feasibility studies were conducted only in communities that 
volunteered to be investigated. At the moment, detailed site investigations are being 
conducted in two municipalities that are considered to be potential hosts. According to 
polls, the population of the both municipalities accepts a repository. In Sweden we have 
a remarkable example of how results of public opinion polls can be misleading: after six 
national opinion polls had shown acceptance of site investigations, two local referenda 
rejected continuation of the research in the municipalities.  
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In the USA, the Yucca Mountain has recently been approved as the site for a 
national SNF repository. However, the local government, many experts and a majority 
of Nevadans have opposed the program, which has lead to serious delays. The protests 
continue despite a recent wide-scale public participation program that has included 
numerous public hearings, admission of comments and the general policy of openness. 
This may be because public involvement programs that only seek to change public 
attitudes will be resisted. Public involvement may require a real chance for the public to 
affect the outcome, not merely agree to it.  
The analysis of spent fuel management programs in Sweden, Finland and the 
USA shows examples of policies that have been changing towards a more open 
approach. Having analyzed the experience of these countries, we may note the 
following features of the site selection processes. First, communities that already have 
nuclear objects on their territories may be more willing to accept a facility than those 
that do not have nuclear industries. Second, the citizens’ awareness that they have a 
right of veto makes may make them more willing to accept a facility. On the contrary, 
when people feel that the decision will be taken regardless of their attitudes, they are 
more likely to oppose it. 
For successful public participation in a nuclear-related decision-making process, 
some basic conditions should be satisfied. The information about the problem and 
possible ways of its solution should be available to people early before plans and 
positions are fixed. Decision-making should be organized in such a way that the 
population could affect decisions from the very beginning. Transparency should be 
assured not only to the information but also to the process of decision-making. 
Consultation and participation should be seen to be fair and contain possibilities of 
selecting among options or getting changes made. 
In the process of decision-making on SNF management, attention should be paid 
to public concerns. When designing public surveys, the following aspects should be 
taken into account. The contents of the questionnaire should be simple and easy enough 
for public to understand, but should be also soundly based, so that the public will be 
willing to participate in the poll. Before answering the questions about the attitude to a 
proposal, people should get full and objective information about expected benefits and 
disadvantages. It is important to include issues of compensation, trusted institutions, 
trusted sources of information, and desirable means of public involvement in the 
questionnaire. The use of a professional polling organization in both design and 
administration of the poll could improve the reliability and credibility of the results of 
the poll. Attention must be paid to the method of polling because it can influence the 
results. Serious analysis and use of the results are essential for developing a policy of 
SNF management. Neglecting public concerns may lead not only to project failure, but 
also to the loss of trust in the authorities. 
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